By Sextus Empiricus, Richard Bett
By way of a long way the main exact surviving exam by means of any historic Greek sceptic of epistemology and common sense, this paintings seriously experiences the pretensions of non-sceptical philosophers, to have found tools for choosing the reality, both via direct statement or by way of inference from the saw to the unobserved. a superb instance of the Pyrrhonist sceptical procedure at paintings, it additionally offers vast information regarding the tips of different Greek thinkers, which many times, are poorly preserved in different assets.
Read Online or Download Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) PDF
Similar epistemology books
During this provocative and wide-ranging e-book, Michael Devitt argues for a thoroughgoing realism in regards to the commonsense and clinical actual global, and for a correspondence thought of fact. moreover, he argues that, opposite to got opinion, the metaphysical query of realism is detailed from, and ahead of, any semantic query approximately fact.
Lazare Carnot used to be the original instance within the historical past of technological know-how of somebody who inadvertently owed the clinical acceptance he finally accomplished to prior political prominence. He and his son Sadi produced paintings that derived from their education as engineering and went mostly disregarded through physicists for a new release or extra, even supposing their respective paintings brought thoughts that proved primary while taken up later by way of different arms.
- Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur (Kantstudien-Erganzungshefte) (German Edition)
- Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Groundless Belief
- An Introduction to Design Arguments (Cambridge Introductions to Philosophy)
Additional info for Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy)
For some criteria are skilled and some are ordinary; but neither do Against the Logicians the ordinary ones judge (just as the ordinary person does not), nor do the skilled ones (just as the skilled person does not), for the reasons stated earlier. Therefore nothing is a criterion. Protagoras (–) () Some people have also included Protagoras of Abdera in the chorus of philosophers who do away with the criterion, since he says that all appearances and opinions are true, and that truth is among the things in relation to something, given the fact that everything that has appeared to or been opined by someone is immediately the case in relation to that person.
We would not say it is the ordinary person. For he is defective in his knowledge of the peculiarities of skills. The blind person does not grasp the workings of sight, nor the deaf person those of hearing. And so, too, the unskilled person does not have a sharp eye when it comes to the apprehension of what has been achieved through skill, since if we actually back this person in his judgment on some matter of skill, there will be no difference between skill and lack of skill, which is absurd. So the ordinary person is not a judge of the peculiarities of skills.
For the very person saying this is a human being, and in positing that which appears in relation to himself, he agrees that this very point is among the things that appear in relation to himself. Hence, too, the insane person is a reliable criterion of the things that appear in insanity, and the sleeping person of the things that strike us in sleep, the child of the things that strike us in childhood, and the old person of the things that strike us in old age. () And it is not appropriate to reject one set of circumstances on the basis of a different set of circumstances – that is, to reject the things that appear when one is insane on the basis of the things that happen when one is of sound mind, or those in sleep on the basis of those in wakefulness, or those in childhood on the basis of those in old age.